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| Terrorism Review |
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June 1986

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| | Terrorism Review |
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| | June 1986 |
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| | This review is published every month by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. |

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| | Terrorism Review | 25 X 1 |
| | June 1986 | |
| Focus | A New Era in International Terrorism? | 25 X 1 |
| | The US airstrike on Libya on 14 April prompted a flurry of anti-US and anti-British terrorism—as well as an enormous increase in the number of plots reported to us—but it is too soon to tell if we are witnessing a fundamental change in the international terrorist picture. More likely, the US military action has accelerated the pace of several alarming trends already in motion—namely: • The anti-American bent of international terrorists may well intensify. • States will turn increasingly to proven surrogates to carry out attacks on their behalf. • Terrorists will become even more indiscriminate in their use of violence, paying little or no heed to the fate of innocent bystanders. • Public gathering places and transportation facilities will be the preferred venues | |
| | for attacks. | 25 X 1 |
| | Qadhafi's Next Moves Although Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's confidence and his domestic position both have been eroded since the US airstrikes, we believe that Libya will continue plotting terrorism, particularly against the United States. The expulsion of Libyan diplomats from major capitals has damaged Tripoli's network in Western Europe, and European security measures almost certainly have forced the remaining Libyans to limit their activities. | 25X1 |
| | Nevertheless, Qadhafi can still turn to radical Palestinians such as Abu Nidal whose infrastructure is intact. The planning of new terrorist spectaculars may be in abeyance while Qadhafi focuses on his internal problems, although previously authorized attacks could still occur if Libyan agents have access to a target of opportunity. Qadhafi also could be waiting to launch a major attack until after intensive security dies down. | 25X1 |
| | Increased Threat to the United States? US personnel and facilities remain a key target for terrorist attacks, although it is private Americans—rather than diplomats or military personnel—who increasingly are victimized by terrorist bombings and hijackings. Because a massive attack against an official American facility—especially after security has been upgraded—would have such dramatic impact, some terrorist groups almost certainly will continue to plan such an event. But terrorists will strike increasingly at public gathering places and commercial establishments such as discotheques and restaurants because such attacks are virtually impossible to prevent. | 25X1 |
| | Terrorists may also redouble their efforts to stage an attack inside the United States. Despite his threats, the Palestine Liberation Front's Abu Abbas currently lacks this capability, but the Libyans will certainly increase their efforts among US radical groups. | 25 X 1 |
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Some groups may be more willing to attack US interests, while others may refrain—for fear of US retaliation. Some states that shelter terrorists on their soil may crack down on terrorists' activities or expel them: • Several groups—including Libyan-sponsored ones—probably will wait for intensive security to die down before undertaking further dramatic acts. Damascus will be extremely cautious in the short term about allowing international terrorists to operate from Syria after recent revelations about Syrian-sponsored terrorism in Europe. 25X1 State Sponsorship and the Palestinians In the Middle East, Iran, Syria, and Libya will continue to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. They increasingly work through intermediaries or surrogates—which makes it more difficult for us to identify with confidence those responsible. Libya, for example, has not used its own nationals as hitmen since last November, although Libyan-sponsored terrorism has reached a new and deadly stage through the use of radical Palestinians. Similarly, pro-Khomeini Iranians have rarely been caught in acts of terrorism, although Iranian-inspired Lebanese Shias have carried out some of the most bloody anti-Western attacks, and now hold nearly 20 Western hostages. 25X1 The ties between state sponsors and newly resurgent Palestinian terrorists have raised the level of violence and widened the circle of targets in recent months. Palestinian terrorism accounted for one-fourth of all international terrorist attacks last year—a staggering 100-percent increase over 1984—and some of the most spectacular and bloody incidents as well. States will take advantage of the splintering Palestinian movement for their own ends, including using disgruntled Palestinians as hired guns. Meanwhile, pro- and anti-Arafat factions will continue their bloody internal feud, which often takes innocent lives. 25X1 What Next? Terrorist groups will continue to refine their tactics. Terrorists are using more sophisticated explosive devices and are improving concealment techniques. The 25X6 Palestinian terrorist group 15 May Organization built a number of extremely sophisticated suitcase bombs that now are in the hands of unknown terrorists around the world. These weapons could surface over a period of years. 25X1 We remain seriously concerned that Middle Eastern groups, as they expand their reach, will move beyond Europe to operate in Latin America and the Far East. Terrorist groups from different regions also may strengthen their ties and eventually coordinate a joint operation—most likely against the United States: • We know that Europeans and Middle Easterners sometimes attend the same

training camps, share arms supplies, and have developed personal relationships.

• Libya and Iran are seeking to attract Muslim adherents in Africa and the Far East, where some recruits might be willing to engage in subversive activity.

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| • Libya will continue to promote violence in Latin America, knowing that it will have more effect so close to the United States. | 25 X 1 |
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| Finally, terrorists are likely to continue to probe for targets that score the most impact; bombs and shootings in public places and hijackings are currently the favored methods. There will still be attempted assassinations of well-known figures, but businessmen and tourists—people who cannot be adequately protected—increasingly may be targets. The security and police forces of host governments will have to work more doggedly and cooperatively together to stymie the terrorists who operate on their soil. Successful counterterrorism measures, however, almost certainly will force the terrorists to look for new places and persons to attack. Given an almost limitless variety of targets and locations, the | |
| next steps for international terrorism will remain fluid and hard to predict. | 25 X ′ |

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| | Highlights | 25X1 |
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| | Key Indicators | |
| Denmark | Palestinian Radicals Plan Attacks The Palestinian group led by Abu Musa reportedly is planning a bombing campaign in Copenhagen directed at public places frequented by US citizens. The group, which opposes PLO leader Yasir Arafat, reportedly will receive support for the operation from the Abu Nidal network | 25X1 25X1 |
| | The Abu Musa group has not been able to carry out attacks in Western Europe, but it probably could do so with the support of the Abu Nidal network. The two groups, however, have not previously carried out joint operations. If Syria learns of the plan, Damascus—which feels exposed on terrorism after the El Al bombing attempt—may order the group to cancel or postpone the operation. | 25X1 |
| West Germany | Increased Threat to US Headquarters The Red Army Faction (RAF) may attempt a terrorist attack against US European Command (EUCOM) facilities or personnel in retaliation for the airstrike on Libya on 14 April. Recent articles in the West German radical press indicate that the RAF holds EUCOM responsible for having directed the airstrike. The group carried out extensive surveillance of EUCOM's Patch Barracks in 1984, but did not follow up that activity with an attack. | 25X1 |
| | Significant Developments | |
| France | Courts Sentence Spanish Basque Leader The recently arrested leader of the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing (ETA-M), Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, was sentenced in Bayonne on 15 May to three months in prison on arms possession charges. Iturbe, also known by the Basque name Txomin, was arrested at a roadblock on 27 April and charged with violating an order restricting his movements. | 25 X 1 |
| | A refugee in France since 1969, Iturbe was restricted to the town of Tours in central France in January 1984, but fled one week later. He will be tried for this offense later. Although Madrid undoubtedly will request Iturbe's extradition, Spanish officials reportedly see his arrest and sentencing as a sign of increased cooperation by the French Government in combating Basque terrorism. | 25X1 |

France

Government Plans More Counterterrorist Measures

Officials of France's new conservative government plan to submit new counterterrorist legislation agreed to on 28 May to Parliament for enactment. The Repression of Terrorism Bill calls for:

- Cutting in half the jail terms of terrorists who inform on other terrorists.
- Offering cash rewards to private individuals who inform police about suspicious persons.
- Establishing special courts and dispensing with jury trials in terrorist cases.
- Extending preventive detention from two to four days.
- Maintaining the right to dissolve foreign associations that "gravely disturb the peace in France."

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There also are new measures directed against common criminals that are likely to bolster France's counterterrorist efforts, including the right for police to conduct identity checks at will and to fingerprint and photograph those who refuse to show their papers. Officials are recommending that jail sentences for assassins of judges, jurors, or policemen be extended from 15 to 20 years. There also are plans to draft a bill regulating foreigners entering and living in France and for a national identity card. Procedures for expelling illegal foreign residents will be simplified, and there are plans to make visas mandatory for all non-European Economic Community visitors.

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Although there will be criticism from the left that the government is overreacting to terrorism and infringing on civil liberties, public concern over French authorities' inability to control terrorism will probably ensure passage of the bill.

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France-Palestinians

Tunisian Confession Raises Questions About 15 May Organization

Habib Maamar, arrested by French police in Nancy on 8 May for beating his girlfriend, claims he is a member of the Palestinian terrorist group 15 May and that he carried out several bombings in Paris and London. Two of the attacks previously claimed—damaged branches of the British department store Marks and Spencer in Paris in February 1985 and in London in December 1983. One person was killed and 14 were injured in the Paris bombing. In a third bombing, Maamar claimed that he detonated a device at the Israeli Bank Leumi in Paris in August 1984 and unsuccessfully attempted to bomb the El Al airline office in London on an unspecified date.

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Maamar's confession suggests that 15 May is still an active terrorist organization. Iraq had restrained its leader, Abu Ibrahim, and that group members may have been operating independently on behalf of other groups. Maamar claims, however, that he met Abu Ibrahim in Baghdad and received \$3,000 each time he successfully set off a bomb.

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France-Iran

Iranian Exile Leader Forced From France

Iranian exile leader Masud Rajavi, faced with increasing pressure from the French Government, arrived in Baghdad on 8 June, following a police raid on his

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| | headquarters in France. Rajavi, chairman of the National Council of Iranian Resistance and leader of the opposition organization Mujahedin-e Khalq, had been living in a suburb of Paris since 1981. His continuing operations there were believed to be a major stumblingblock in France's delicate negotiations with Iran about the fate of nine French hostages in Lebanon. | 25 X 1 |
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| | Although the Council claimed that Rajavi left France voluntarily, it is more likely that his departure was brought about by Prime Minister Chirac's desire to obtain the release of the French hostages held by Hizballah and to improve relations with Tehran. Rajavi's arrival in Baghdad was quickly followed by a statement from the Iranian Government that Tehran cannot force pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon to free the hostages. | 25 X 1 |
| Spain | Anti-US Terrorist Ring Broken Up Spanish police apparently have broken up a rightwing terrorist organization known as "The Call of Jesus Christ." The multinational group, which was planning acts of terrorism against US interests in Spain, was founded in Lebanon in 1979 to resist the Israeli occupation. Two of the 10 arrested—four Spaniards, three Lebanese, a Syrian, a Jordanian, and a Portuguese—confessed that they were promised Libyan financing for terrorist acts. The suspects reportedly expected to receive \$70,000 from Libyan officials for an attempted bombing at the Bank of America in Madrid and for bombing the Air France office in Lisbon on | |
| | 11 April. | 25 X 1 |
| Spain | ETA Begins Another Summer Bombing Campaign ETA announced on 26 May that it would initiate another terrorist campaign similar to last summer's against Spanish tourist facilities along the Mediterranean coast. In early June the group warned 200 embassies, travel agencies, and foreign media that tourists will be in danger from its campaign. In response to ETA's announcement, the Antiterrorist Liberation Group promised to retaliate for every ETA bomb with a bombing in the Basque country. | 25 X 1 |
| | To date, ETA has planted at least seven bombs either in or near hotels along the Costa del Sol. Most of the bombs have exploded, but the damage has been minimal and there have been no injuries. The sabotage campaign will probably have a serious impact on the already flagging tourist industry. | 25X1 |
| Portugal | FP-25 Defendant Blames Right for Car Bombing Gobern Lopes, a defendant in the ongoing trial of members of the terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25), testified that, despite his group's prior claims, the car bombing on 18 February outside the US Embassy in Lisbon was an attempt by the extreme right to destabilize the political situation. He cited the bombing of a truck in Restelo the night before the second round of the presidential elections as a similar act. The defendant admitted that he was a founding member of the group and claimed responsibility for many other terrorist acts. He estimated | |
| | that FP-25 has killed about six persons. | 25 X 1 |

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| Italy | Arrest Warrants Issued in Rome Airport Attack A Rome magistrate issued arrest warrants in May for 15 individuals—including Palestinian radical Abu Nidal. The warrants charged the defendants with participating in an "armed band" and were issued for last December's attack on Rome's Da Vinci Airport and other incidents in Italy reaching back to 1982. Press reports indicate that only three of the 15 are at large; the rest are in custody in Italy. Because it has so many terrorist suspects in jail, Italy remains vulnerable to retaliatory attacks. | 25 X 1 |
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| Israel | Police Break Up Palestinian Terrorist Cell On 29 April, Jerusalem police arrested 20 terrorist suspects reportedly connected to the radical Palestinian Abu Musa faction. Israeli officials announced that the cell was responsible for several recent terrorist attacks in Jerusalem, including the murder on 13 April of a British tourist. Among the suspects were three of 1,150 prisoners freed by Israel in May 1985. Abu Musa cells have been active in Lebanon, but have not operated previously in the West Bank. The existence of such a cell is symptomatic of the growing strength of anti-Arafat Palestinians on the West Bank. | 25X1 25X1 |
| North Yemen | US Embassy Officer Wounded a communicator at the US Embassy in Khartoum, was shot while riding in his car by an unidentified assailant on 25 April, 11 days after the US airstrike on Tripoli and Benghazi. Two men in a Toyota Land Cruiser reportedly overtook Pollick and fired several shots, two of which struck him survived the attack and underwent surgery in Khartoum. Yemeni authorities reportedly arrested a number of suspects—including one Libyan—in connection with the assault, but the full extent of Libyan involvement in the attack is still unclear. Pollick may have been a target of opportunity rather than the victim of a carefully prepared operation. | 25X6 25X1 25X1 25X1 |
| Iran | Training Shia Terrorists for the Persian Gulf Iran reportedly is providing terrorist training to Persian Gulf Shias in Tehran. At least 100 Saudis and Bahrainis currently are said to be receiving several months of training in revolutionary theory, the use of weapons and explosives, and psychological conditioning that stresses martyrdom. | 25X1 25X1 |

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| | Iran is working largely through the Organization for Islamic Revolution on the Peninsula (OIRAP)—a small Islamic fundamentalist group formed by Saudi dissidents in 1975. It has been headquartered in Tehran since 1980 and receives most of its support from Iran. OIRAP has focused most of its efforts on propaganda and has not claimed responsibility for terrorist acts, but it probably was behind bloody riots in the Shia areas of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 1979 and 1980. The leader of the group, Hasan Musa al-Safar, is a radical Shia cleric reportedly living in Tehran. | 25X1 |
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| | An increase in Iranian-sponsored terrorism in the Gulf would threaten US interests, particularly the 18,000 Americans in the Eastern Province. Gulf security services probably cannot prevent increased terrorist activity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in spite of frequent arrests and detentions of suspected subversives. The relative lack of terrorism in those areas now results more from Iranian reluctance to use the terrorist option and the trainees' ineptitude than from efforts by internal security forces. While attacks on the Gulf states would initially be designed to gain limited Iranian goals, such a campaign would provide more radical Iranian leaders with an opportunity to press for an extended effort to export the Islamic revolution through the Gulf. | 25 X 1 |
| El Salvador | Kidnaper of Duarte's Daughter Killed On 29 April the Salvadoran Armed Forces Press Office reported the death on 13 April of "Commandante Junior," head of the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) unit which planned the kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter Ines last fall. "Junior" and a group of six terrorists armed with Soviet fragmentation grenades and small arms attempted to hold up a car in an area just north of San Salvador. The car was occupied by two plainclothes policemen. Junior and another terrorist, possibly an FAL squad leader, were killed in the ensuing gun battle. | 25X 25X1 |
| Costa Rica | New Terrorist Group Formed? The New Republic Movement (MNR), a radical leftist revolutionary organization, reportedly has formed a 20-person terrorist unit—some of whom may have received training in Libya. | 25X ∠5X |
| Costa Rica | Basque Terrorist Extradited to Spain A member of the ETA-M, Gregorio Jiminez Morales ("El Pistolas"), was extradited from Costa Rica to Spain on 9 May. He will be held without bail in Spain until 13 September when he will be tried on 13 counts of terrorist activity. "El Pistolas" fled to Costa Rica in mid-1983, and was arrested in September of that year by Costa Rican police, who suspected him of participating in the attempt on the life of Nicaraguan Contra leader Eden Pastora. Although he was never convicted on those charges, he was charged and imprisoned for four years for violation of immigration regulations. Costa Rica agreed to Spain's extradition request only after Jiminez completed his sentence. | 25X1 |

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| Colombia | M-19 Changing Plans in Wake of Leader's Death? The 19th of April Movement (M-19) reportedly is reevaluating its strategy in the | |
| | wake of the death of its leader, Alvaro Fayad Delgado. | 25 2 |
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| | Internal squabbling and the M-19's interest in bolstering the capabilities of the | |
| | rural front and the America Battalion probably account for the current lull in urban terrorist activity. The only significant terrorist violence perpetrated by the | |
| | group for more than seven months was a spate of low-level bombings in Bogota in mid-May. | 2 |
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| Ecuador | Terrorist Splinter Group Kidnaps Lawyer An obscure leftist terrorist group calling itself the Montoneras Patria Libre (MPL) | |
| | kidnaped Dr. Enrique Echeverria, a prominent Ecuadorean lawyer, on 20 May and released him unharmed five days later. Dr. Echeverria was freed when Ecuadorean | |
| | security forces located and surrounded the house where he was being held, | _ |
| | negotiated an end to the ordeal, and arrested the terrorists. | 2 |
| | The MPL first surfaced in January when it occupied a national monument in Quito and seized the weapons of several guards. The group is a breakaway | |
| | dissident faction of the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) terrorist group and probably numbers no more than 50 members. | 25 |
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Argentina Antigovernment Bombings Continue

On 29 May an anonymous telephone call led to the discovery of an explosive device in a military barracks where President Alfonsin was scheduled to address an officers' group. Another device was discovered under a bridge on Alfonsin's route to an artillery demonstration. At least nine low-level bombings of offices of the ruling Radical Party have been reported since early May. These incidents probably are the work of rightwing extremists or disgruntled military elements protesting the Falklands war trial verdicts or the continuing prosecutions of officials involved in the "dirty war" on domestic terrorism in the 1970s.

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| Pakistan | Series of Anti-Saudi Explosions in Karachi On 27 May a series of four bombs exploded in a 15-minute period at four separate locations in Karachi, killing a local security guard and wounding two other persons. The targets included the cargo office of Pan American Airlines—probably targeted because it was in a Saudi-owned building—and three offices of Saudia Airlines. No group claimed credit for the blasts and there is no known connection to the bombing of the Pan Am ticket office in Karachi last summer by a Pakistani student. | 25 |
| | Pakistani authorities arrested more than 30 suspects on 28 and 29 May, including seven Libyans and an unspecified number of Iranians. A carload of Iranians who were apparently conducting surveillance of the Consulate General on 28 May fired a shot at a local guard who approached them and then sped off. | 25 |
| Sri Lanka | New Wave of Urban Terrorism In two spectacular attacks, Tamil separatist guerrillas brought massive violence to the capital of Sri Lanka in an apparent effort to torpedo Indian-brokered peace talks between other Tamil insurgents and the Jayewardene government: | |
| | • On 3 May a bomb blew the tail off an Air Lanka passenger jet preparing to take off from Colombo for the Maldives. Among the 16 persons killed in the blast were three Britons, three French citizens, two Japanese, two Maldivians, two West Germans, three Sri Lankans, and the wife of a PLO official (nationality unknown). | |
| | • On 7 May a large bomb demolished Colombo's Central Telegraph Office, killing at least nine persons and wounding between 50 and 140 others. | 25 |
| | Although Colombo has been the scene of nuisance bombings in the past, these attacks represent a new level of violence. Suspicion in the airliner case centers around the Tamil Eelam Army, a group thought to be responsible for an aborted 1984 bombing of another Air Lanka jet that left 29 persons dead at the Madras, India, airport. In that attack the bomb had been intended for a passenger jet bound for Colombo. If the 3 May bomb had gone off after the plane was airborne, as many as 150 persons could have been killed. | 25> |
| | In the telegraph office bombing, several suspects have been arrested, but no group has yet been identified. Both bombings came just after an Indian Government | 237 |
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| | delegation had arrived in Colombo to explore ways of restarting stalled talks on Tamil grievances. Although these bombings have not yet led to the kind of widespread Sinhalese backlash against Tamils seen after some past atrocities, they have led to a government crackdown on Tamils in the northern part of the island and may lead to a stiffer position in negotiations. | 25 X 1 |
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| Sri Lanka | Tamil Terrorists Attack Less Militant Rivals The most violent of the Tamil separatist groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), reportedly destroyed facilities of a rival group and killed its leader on the night of 29 April. LTTE forces were said to have attacked and overrun several camps of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) in Sri Lanka, killing more than 120 rival guerrillas, including TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam. Although some members and facilities of the less radical TELO still exist in India, the LTTE destroyed at least one TELO facility in Madras on 8 May. TELO is reportedly rearming and may be able to recover from these blows. The LTTE has been responsible for most of the attacks on government forces and, by attacking TELO, has strengthened its own position of radical leadership and sent a message to other moderate groups that were considering negotiating with the government. | 2574 |
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| Indonesia | Homemade Mortars Hit US and Japanese Embassies On the morning of 14 May, a mortar projectile hit the roof of the US Embassy in Jakarta but failed to explode. A similar projectile fired from a nearby hotel room hit a wall of the Japanese Embassy and also failed to explode. An hour after this second attack, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot of an office building housing the Canadian Embassy and destroyed at least six cars. Credit for the attacks was claimed later that day in telephone calls to press agencies in Tokyo, Paris, and Rome on behalf of the previously unheard of "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade." The spokespersons said the attacks were conducted in retaliation for the antiterrorism declarations of the Tokyo Economic Summit. Although the claims did not specify the nationality of the group, the hotel room had been rented by a Japanese man; a passport found in the room had been reported as stolen from a Japanese tourist in India in 1984. | 25X1 25X1 |
| | The firing of homemade rockets from unattended launchers is the hallmark of a number of Japanese radical groups that staged similar attacks in and around Tokyo from late March through the Economic Summit in early May, but the warheads of these devices contained TNT and shrapnel—materials not used by Japanese groups. Moreover, none of these groups is known to have operated outside Japan, and such a move would represent a major departure in strategy for any of them. Indonesian authorities have not yet turned up any evidence that the attacks were the work of an indigenous group. | 25X1 |

Japan Chukaku-h

Chukaku-ha Rockets Western Economic Summit

In spite of the most stringent security measures ever instituted in Japan, on 4 May the leftist radical group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) fired five homemade rockets at the State Guest House where heads of government were arriving for the Western Economic Summit. All of the rockets missed their target and struck the street, sidewalks, and a building near the Canadian Embassy. There were no casualties and damage was minimal. The group was known to have developed a rocket with a range of 4,000 meters, but it managed to launch these devices from an apartment well within the 1,500-meter police security perimeter. Chukaku-ha vowed to carry out further attacks before the summit concluded on 6 May, but there were no other incidents.

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Although the physical damage was insignificant, this incident was embarrassing to the Nakasone government, which had striven to prevent an attack during the summit. As anticipated, Chukaku-ha accepted the likelihood of an unsuccessful attack and concentrated on a psychological effect. Arrests since the first of the year have hurt the group's covert arm, and it was seeking publicity to enhance its appeals for new members and funds.

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| Terrorism Since the Raid | or |
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| Libya—What Do the | |
| Numbers Say? | |

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The level of international terrorist activity has shown no appreciable change during the 45-day period following the US airstrikes on Libya compared with a similar period preceding the raids. Although international terrorist attacks increased immediately following the US naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra on 24 and 25 March and again after the US airstrikes on 14 April, the elevated levels did not persist over the sixweek period. And, surprisingly, the most dramatic upsurge in terrorist activity following the Gulf of Sidra did not occur in the Middle East or Western Europe—where it might have been expected—but in Latin America. Anti-US terrorist groups in that region almost certainly did not act at Libya's behest but seized the opportunity to lash out once again at US targets as part of an ongoing anti-US campaign, to demonstrate their fraternal solidarity with Libya, or to express empathy with others who condemn "US imperialism." The total number of casualties—killed and wounded-dropped from some 500 to below 400, with US casualties down especially sharply, from about 70 to a mere handful. Fatalities, however, rose from 99 in the earlier period to 167 in the later.

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America rose from 18 to 22 attacks from one period to

- There were no spectacular incidents such as the 5
 April bombing of the West Berlin discotheque that killed two persons—one a US soldier—and injured more than 200, including 64 Americans. Another US soldier died two months later. This explains the significant fall-off in casualties of all nationalities.
- Military and diplomatic targets experienced increased levels of activity in the period after the airstrikes, though the numbers were still relatively small. The number of attacks against military targets increased from six to 15 and, in the case of diplomatic targets, rose from 13 to 18. Business interests continued to be a favorite target.

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Past experience demonstrates that a dramatic upsurge in international terrorist incidents usually occurs in the immediate aftermath of significant political or military events. In the wake of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in June 1982, for example, a rash of international terrorist incidents occurred worldwide, with many claimants linking their actions to solidarity with the Arab victims. Such events usually also trigger enormous increases in the number of reported plots, threats, and hoaxes we receive; we have not included these in our statistics. Moreover, heightened awareness and enhanced security in the wake of the US airstrikes on Libya prevented at least one potentially spectacular attack at London's Heathrow Air-

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Review of the Data

We judge that it is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the impact of the strikes. Discerning trends requires larger pools of information for more extended periods of time. Nevertheless, the available data do permit some generalizations:

• The number of attacks against US persons and property rose by more than 20 percent, but most of that increase occurred in Latin America. The numbers we are dealing with, however, are very small: the total number of anti-US incidents in Latin

Target: United Kingdom

port.

British interests suffered more international terrorist attacks in the six-week period following the raids than in the earlier comparable period, probably because of the United Kingdom's assistance with the US air-strikes. Several incidents that resulted in British

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Chronology of Major Events, March-April 1986 24-25 March US conducts naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra. Air battle ensues in which US airstrikes damage radar complex at Surt; also, 6th Fleet successfully attacks several Libyan patrol boats; spurs Qadhafi to call for attacks against US targets. 29 March • Two British citizens kidnaped in Beirut; Libya believed responsible. • Bombing of German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin; Syria believed responsible. 2 April Bomb explodes aboard TWA Flight 840 as it approached Athens, killing four Americans and wounding nine others. Device similar to those placed on airliners in 1982 by the Palestinian group 15 May. 5 April • La Belle discotheque in West Berlin bombed. One US soldier killed. another dies later; more than 200 wounded. Libya held responsible by United States. • French expel two Libyans, two Lebanese, an Algerian and a Tunisian in plot to attack US Embassy in Paris. 14 April US raids on Tripoli and Banghazi. 15 April US national shot by unknown assailant in Khartoum; circumstantial evidence points to Libyan involvement. 17 April • Bodies of American citizen Peter Kilburn and two British hostages seized in late March, discovered; Libya believed responsible. Kilburn was kidnaped in November 1984; the Libyans probably "purchased" him from his original Lebanese captors. • Attempted bombing of El Al flight in London. Syria believed responsible. 18 April Turks arrest four Libyans in plot to bomb US Officers Club in Ankara.

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25 April


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extent of involvement unclear.

US Embassy communicator shot in Sanaa; Libya believed involved, but

Comparison of US and Worldwide Casualties of International Terrorism for Periods 1 March-14 April and 15 April-29 May 1986*



fatalities were expressly linked by their perpetrators

to UK assistance to the United States:


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 On 17 April the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims—a covername for Abu Nidal claimed it had executed British journalist Alec Collett, who was abducted in Lebanon in March 1985. A communique asserted that Collett was killed "to punish Thatcher" for British support for the US raid. • Also on 17 April, the bodies of two British hostages (along with that of an American seized in Beirut in November 1984) kidnaped a few days after the US operation in the Gulf of Sidra—almost certainly at Libyan behest—were discovered in Lebanon. A group calling itself the "Arab Revolutionary Cells" claimed responsibility for the murders, stating the three had been killed in response to the US raid and British assistance.

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The El Al jetliner bombing attempt that unfolded in London three days after the airstrike would have been a further blow to the United Kingdom. El Al security personnel uncovered a suitcase bomb unwittingly carried by an Irish woman. Had the device gone off in the air, more than 340 persons probably would have been killed; there were some 230 Americans on board. The incident apparently was unrelated to the US military action and reportedly was planned several months earlier, probably in the wake of the Israeli interception in early February of a Libyan jet carrying senior Syrian officials.

• Qadhafi may be reassessing his international terrorist plans, particularly given the shakeup in personnel at a number of LPBs in Western Europe. As many as 50 Libyans believed to be involved in planning terrorist activity may have been expelled. Alternatively, Qadhafi may be rebuilding his capability in Europe. Some reports indicate that at least some of the Libyans slated to be ousted have actually stayed behind after changing their status to "students."

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Syrian planners may have been trying to exploit the hostilities between the United States and Libya—particularly in the wake of developments in the Gulf of Sidra—on the assumption that Libya would be blamed for acts of anti-US or anti-Israeli terrorism in that timeframe.

Conclusions

Several weeks after the airstrike, the level of international terrorism appears to have dropped somewhat below that of the period preceding the US action in the Gulf of Sidra. This seemingly reduced level may be only temporary:

- Terrorists who have been active require downtime to prepare their next operations—particularly large-scale operations such as car bombings and kidnapings.
- Heightened security measures worldwide probably have deterred many terrorists or, at a minimum, encouraged them to postpone operations until the security environment appears more relaxed.
- Syria, an active state supporter of international terrorism, may have retreated from such activity, at least for the short term, for fear of US retaliation. Damascus's concerns heightened as revelations surfaced of a Syrian role in the attempted bombing of the El Al flight at London in mid-April and the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin in late March.

International Terrorist Incidents^a

Attacks on US and Non-US by Region

Before US airstrikes on Libya/After US airstrikes on Libyab

| Region | US | Non-US | Worldwide Total | |
|-------------|-----|--------|--------------------|--|
| Middle East | 6/4 | 53/53 | 59/57 | |
| | | | | |

| Region | US | Non-US | Worldwide Total |
|----------------|-------|--------|--------------------|
| Middle East | 6/4 | 53/53 | 59/57 |
| Western Europe | 9/11 | 10/9 | 19/20 |
| Latin American | 18/22 | 5/3 | 23/25 |
| Other | 4/8 | 8/9 | 12/17 |
| Total | 37/45 | 76/74 | 113/119 |

| Attacks on US an | d Non-US by | Type of Event | |
|--------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Type of Event | US | Non-US | Worldwide Total |
| Armed attack | 3/5 | 17/21 | 20/26 |
| Arson | 2/7 | 11/7 | 13/14 |
| Assault | | 2/3 | 2/3 |
| Bombing | 28/32 | 37/38 | 65/70 |
| Extortion/ harassment | 1/0 | | 1/0 |
| Kidnaping | 2/1 | 9/5 | 11/6 |
| Sabotage/ vandalism | 1/0 | | 1/0 |
| Total | 37/45 | 76/74 | 113/119 |

| Type of Target d | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------|------------|----------|----------|-------|---------|
| Type of Event | Military | Government | Business | Diplomat | Other | Total |
| Armed attack | 0/3 | 4/3 | 3/12 | 4/4 | 13/8 | 24/30 |
| Arson | 0/2 | 0/2 | 1/3 | 0/1 | 11/10 | 12/18 |
| Assault | | 0/1 | | | 2/2 | 2/3 |
| Bombing | 5/10 | 12/9 | 26/14 | 8/11 | 36/31 | 87/75 |
| Extortion/harassment | | | 1/0 | | | 1/0 |
| Kidnaping | 1/0 | 1/0 | 2/0 | 1/2 | 9/4 | 14/6 |
| Sabotage/vandalism | | | 1/0 | | | 1/0 |
| Total | 6/15 | 17/15 | 34/29 | 13/18 | 71/55 | 141/132 |

b This table compares data on international terrorist incidents for the 45-day periods before and after the US airstrikes.

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c Indudes Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia/Pacific, North America, USSR/Eastern Europe.

d These numbers are higher than the total number of incidents because of the capability of recording multiple victims and/or installations attacked.

Syrian Involvement in Incidents in West Berlin and London

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The El Al Bomb

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Syria was involved in both the 29 March bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin and the 17 April attempted bombing of an El Al airliner in London. In recent years, Syria has minimized its direct involvement in terrorism by using surrogate groups—mostly radical Palestinians—instead of its own personnel, but Syrian officials were directly involved in the planning and execution of both the West Berlin and London operations. The London operative, Nizar Hindawi, and his brother in West Berlin, Ahmed Hasi, appear to have been freelance terrorists who had worked with Syrian officials since at least early this year. Moreover, they claim that Syrian Embassy personnel in East Berlin and London provided the bombs for both operations.

The timing device used in the El Al bomb is similar to the "voting day timer" first used by Syriansponsored groups to bomb Jordanian polling places during the 1984 election. This incident marks the second time the device has been discovered outside the Middle East. In February 1985 police arrested an individual at Frankfurt International Airport who had flown in from Damascus with a disassembled bomb that included a voting day timer. The individual, however, was never conclusively tied to Syrian officials.

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The Syrian Connection

 Hasi's brother, Hindawi, meanwhile, had been involved in the El Al plot since at least February.
 He claims to have received instructions in Damascus for his mission from two individuals.

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Hindawi, Hasi, and two Palestinian accomplices first traveled to Libya last summer seeking funding for what Hindawi claimed was a new terrorist organization in Western Europe. Tripoli reportedly failed to provide funding, so the ringleader, Hindawi, then went on to Damascus alone to discuss the "organization" with Syrian officials. Late last year or early this year Hindawi established a Syrian connection that led to the terrorist operations in West Berlin and London:

During a trip to Berlin earlier this year, Hindawi reportedly suggested to Hasi and the two
Palestinians, Salameh and Sahawneh, that they bomb the German-Arab Friendship Union because it had severed its ties to radical Palestinian causes.
Hasi claims to have picked up the bomb at the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin and carried it into West Berlin in early March. After two unsuccessful attempts to detonate the bomb, an explosives "expert" from Damascus arrived to repair the device. On 29 March they successfully bombed the building.

Syrian Motives

The motivation for the incidents in London and West Berlin remains unclear. Nevertheless, we suspect that the triggering incident for the El Al operation was the Israeli interception on 4 February of a Libyan jet carrying Syrian Ba'thist Party members. Syria vowed retaliation, although President Assad publicly stated that he would not endorse action against a civilian airliner. Damascus reportedly was furious about the

| Israeli operation and Syrian intelligence was ordered to retaliate. We suspect that Israel's downing of two MIGs in Syrian airspace last November may also have contributed to the desire to retaliate. We believe the German-Arab Friendship Union bombing was a test for future operations, because Salameh claimed that Hindawi told him that Syrian funding would depend on the Palestinians' ability to "make things happen." | avenge the interception of the Libyan jet, then Damascus may attempt to strike again. Syrian officials, however, are likely to weigh the fallout of the London and West Berlin incidents before moving so boldly again. | 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Syrian involvement in terrorism is authorized by President Assad—at least in general terms. Although the bombing of the German—Arab Friendship Union may not have involved top Syrian officials, we believe it is likely that President Assad was at least aware of the El Al operation. However, the chain of command from Damascus through the Syrian embassies to operatives like Hindawi and Hasi is not believed to be very strict. Operations like these may have built a momentum of their own, once Damascus approved them. It is also possible—although unlikely—that the operations were planned by elements of Syrian intelligence acting on their own. | | 25X1 |
| Outlook The Syrian connection to Hindawi and his band of terrorists has proved to be an embarrassment for Damascus, yet the connection might have been impossible to prove if the El Al attempt had succeeded. | | 25X1 25X1 |
| It is too soon to determine whether the El Al operation was a one-time retaliatory attack or if it represents a willingness by the Syrians to sponsor terrorist attacks directly against non-Arabs in Western Europe. If the El Al operation was set up to | | |
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Europe Takes Decisive Steps Against the Libyans

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The agreement to impose controls on Libyan People's Bureaus (LPBs) reached by the 12 nations of the European Community, and again at the seven-nation Tokyo Economic Summit has led to the expulsion of a number of Libyan diplomats accredited to West European capitals. This action—together with a Libyan-ordered recall of some of its personnel—has made it more difficult for the LPBs to operate, although Libya may turn to the existing Palestinian terrorist support infrastructure in Western Europe. Libyan officials in some West European missions fear further expulsions, geographical limitations on their freedom of travel, and restrictions upon the ability of Libyan students to pursue technical studies.

People's Bureaus: Instruments of Terror

The LPBs have been both a way to maintain formal diplomatic relations and a focal point for Libyan intelligence and terrorist activities. LPB members have long abused their diplomatic status to transport and store weapons and explosives; to provide safehavens and, logistic and intelligence support; and to carry out terrorist attacks on selected targets. Some of these planned attacks were designed to cause large numbers of casualties without any concern for innocent bystanders:

- The LPB in East Berlin clearly was aware in advance of the West Berlin disco bombing. This LPB and the one in Bonn have a long history of actively supporting terrorist activities.
- Personnel from the LPBs in Rome, Athens, and Madrid have been among the most active in Europe, carrying out surveillance and assassination plots.

There are more than 100 LPBs throughout the world. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi abolished the traditional diplomatic structure in 1979 in favor of the LPBs.

Europe Strikes Back

Most West European nations have taken action against LPBs since March, expelling nearly 50 Libyans believed to be involved in planning terrorist activity:

• France expelled two Libyan diplomats on 5 April, following the discovery of a plot against the US Consulate in Paris. At least four Arabs were

arrested in connection with the plan.

the Libyan diplomats had recruited and delivered weapons to Arabs for a "massacre" of civilians waiting for visas at the US Consulate. On 19 April four other Libyan citizens were expelled for "activities harmful to the public order." The French press indicated that the four were sent to Paris by Libyan security services to assassinate the American Consul General.

- The government of the *United Kingdom* on 19 April ordered the arrest and expulsion of 19 Libyans allegedly involved in "student revolutionary activities." London has now expelled 22 Libyans as potential subversives and has taken steps to oust more than 330 Libyan trainee pilots and aircraft engineers as security risks. Most of them have agreed to waive their right to appeal deportation.
- In *Portugal* officials expelled five Libyans. Portuguese authorities told the head of the LPB that the movement of the remaining Libyan diplomats would be restricted to within 30 kilometers of Lisbon. He also was directed to report to the Foreign Affairs Minister each month. In an effort to soften an anticipated Libyan backlash, Portuguese officials will allow Tripoli to choose the five who will be expelled.
- The Spanish Foreign Minister announced on 25 April the expulsion of 11 Libyan nationals,

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including three members of the LPB. In early May, Spanish officials announced that the government would soon publish information implicating Libyans in Spain in terrorist activities and acts. Those named would then be expelled. In a separate action, Spain expelled the Libyan Consul General on 9 May for his role in arranging a meeting between a Spanish Army colonel and Libyan leader Qadhafi in January. The colonel was arrested and charged with traveling to Tripoli to seek financial backing for rightwing extremist activities. The head of the LPB left Madrid on 29 May, following reports of his alleged ties to a rightwing terrorist group in Spain. In January, Spain expelled three Libyan officials whom it charged with plotting to assassinate a political opponent of Qadhafi.

- West German officials on 9 April expelled two Libyan diplomats suspected of "various activities not in accordance with the norms of diplomatic behavior" four days after a bomb exploded at La Belle discotheque, killing two and wounding more than 200. Later, on 22 April, the Bonn government decided to expel at least half the staff of the LPB in Bonn and to place restrictions on the rest. The mission will be reduced to 19 employees. At the same time the West German Foreign Ministry also decided to reduce the number of employees at its Embassy in Tripoli from 22 to 19. According to press reports German security officials believe at least half of the LPB staff was involved in subversive activities.
- Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark also have decided to reduce the number of Libyan diplomats in their countries. In late April, Belgian authorities declared seven Libyans persona non grata and expelled three Libyan staff members with security duties. There are 14 Libyan diplomats remaining in Brussels, most of them accredited to The Hague and Luxembourg. Denmark also plans to expel three of seven diplomats from the Libyan mission in Copenhagen. The remaining four diplomats and six other Libyan staff members will be restricted to the Danish capital.
- President Craxi stated initially that *Italy's* economic interests in Libya militated against the

- expulsion of Libyan officials or the severance of diplomatic relations. In early May, however, Italian officials announced plans to reduce the number of Libyan employees in nondiplomatic establishments. When 25 Italian officials were ordered out of Tripoli and Benghazi on 12 May, Italy responded by expelling a number of Libyans. On 13 May, Italy expelled a diplomat from the Libyan consulate in Palermo, Sicily. Ten days later, eight Libyan diplomatic and consular staff employees were ordered to leave Italy as part of the decisions adopted by the European Economic Community in response to Libya's expulsion of Western diplomats. The Italian order applied to three diplomats in Rome and five consular employees in Milan. The following day, five more Libyan citizens employees of a Libyan publishing company—were asked to leave because they did not have work permits. Police in Rome later identified 28 illegal Libyan residents; 12 of the 28 were located and given until 1 June to leave the country.
- Austria ordered seven Libyan diplomats to leave the country. Following the airport attacks in Vienna and Rome in December 1985, Vienna warned Tripoli not to increase the number of diplomats in Austria. Another seven diplomats arrived, however, and Vienna has demanded that they leave. The Austrian Foreign Minister is also collecting information on 20 other Libyan diplomats in Vienna.
- Although Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece signed the European Community agreement on measures against Libya, he has not yet taken action against Tripoli, but he has put Libyans under increased surveillance.
- In Turkey police arrested two Libyans who were planning a grenade attack on the American Officer's Club in Ankara. They were sentenced to five years in prison. LPB personnel reportedly were involved in planning the attack. In mid-May, Libya recalled its Ambassador, and Turkey expelled two Libyan diplomats. Following the sentencing of the two Libyans in June for involvement in the planned attack against a US military base, Libya decided to

| withdraw its Ambassador. Forty LPB staff mem- | |
|--|------|
| bers are to be sent home in July for "financial | |
| reasons." | 25X1 |
| icasons. | 25/1 |
| Libyan Response | |
| In retaliation for the measures taken by the European | |
| states against members of the LPBs, the People's | |
| Committee of the Libyan Foreign Liaison Bureau | |
| announced on 12 May the expulsion of 36 diplomats | |
| from seven West European embassies in Tripoli. | |
| These included employees of the Italian, West Ger- | |
| man, French, Dutch, Spanish, Belgian, and Danish | |
| missions. The diplomats ostensibly were expelled for | |
| engaging in activities "incompatible with their diplo- | |
| matic roles." Diplomats from these seven countries | |
| allowed to remain in Libya would be restricted to the | |
| boundaries of the capital. | 25X1 |
| Impact on Terrorist Operations | |
| The recent expulsions apparently have damaged | |
| somewhat Libya's intelligence capability and its abili- | |
| ty to retaliate against the United States. Nevertheless, | |
| none of the LPBs have been closed down altogether. | |
| Libyan agents could still travel to Europe to carry out | |
| attacks, while LPBs elsewhere—such as those in | |
| Latin America or the Far East—could become more | |
| active. In addition, Qadhafi can still turn to radical | |
| Palestinians such as Abu Nidal—whose networks in | |
| Western Europe are untouched—to carry out attacks | |
| on his behalf. Tripoli may also seek to use other | |
| surrogates, such as Palestinian factions or hired mer- | |
| cenaries of other nationalities, in anti-Western at- | |
| tacks. Libya may seek to build a terrorist capability in | |
| Europe separate from the LPBs. Some of the Libyans | |
| recently ordered to leave Western Europe may not | |
| have done so, but may have remained behind after | |
| having given up their diplomatic status. Moreover, | |
| others may well return in a different status, possibly | |
| as students or businessmen. | 25X1 |
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| Terrorism in We | estern |
|-----------------|------------|
| Europe, 1985 | A Regional |
| Profile 1 | |

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At the beginning of 1985, indigenous terrorism was a major concern as the so-called Euroterrorist campaign, which began in 1984, continued into 1985. Three terrorist groups—West Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF), France's Action Directe (AD), and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells (CCC)—had each begun a series of anti-NATO attacks in their respective countries in late 1984, and there was increasing speculation that the groups had joined forces and were working together. Such speculation was fueled by the joint communique issued by the RAF and Action Directe in January calling for a "common anti-imperialist front" in Western Europe, as well as their joint claims of responsibility for two terrorist attacks, one in Paris and one at Rhein-Main Airbase in West Germany. In Brussels, the CCC claimed solidarity with RAF hunger strikers in January with a car bombing of the NATO Support Facility. Such terrorist rhetoric served to complicate the question of whether these terrorist groups had actually formed an alliance, but by the end of 1985 we had not discovered any evidence of operational coordination among them.

The number of domestic terrorist attacks in Western Europe had dropped by autumn, although they remained of serious concern. Palestinian terrorists grabbed the spotlight from European terrorist groups in late 1985 by staging three of the most spectacular incidents to occur in Western Europe that year—the Achille Lauro hijacking and the attacks on the airports in Rome and Vienna. The spillover from the Middle East, which plagued security services all year, may have diverted resources from the pursuit of domestic terrorists in some countries.

In West Germany imprisoned RAF terrorists continued the hunger strike they had begun in December 1984, while the RAF periphery carried out numerous attacks against US- and NATO-related

installations in January. The RAF hardcore claimed to have participated in the assassination that month in Paris of Gen. Rene Audran—a French Ministry of Defense official—along with AD, but the first attack in 1985 that we could definitely attribute to the RAF hardcore was the assassination of West German industrialist Ernst Zimmermann in Munich on 1 February. This attack was a signal to the imprisoned terrorists to end their hunger strike.

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Throughout the year, there were indications that the group's tactics had changed and that it was prepared to engage in more random violence than it had in the 1970s and early 1980s, when targets were carefully chosen for their high symbolic value. This was particularly evident in August when the RAF murdered a low-ranking US serviceman in order to obtain his ID card. The group used the card the next day to gain access to Rhein-Main Airbase where it detonated a car bomb. In the explosion, two Americans were killed and many others wounded. The RAF and AD claimed responsibility jointly, although there has been no indication that AD actually participated in the attack. Two other major attacks in West Germany in 1985—the explosion in the international departure lounge at Frankfurt International Airport in June and the bombing of the PX shopping center in Frankfurt in November—were probably not the work of the RAF, although the cases have never been solved. Middle Eastern involvement is strongly suspected.

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In France the indigenous anarchist group AD was responsible for 17 attacks in 1985, including the assassination of General Audran and the attempted assassination of a second general. By the end of the year, AD seemed to have split into two factions. The "international" faction, which is believed to be a small group of original AD leaders, was probably responsible for the joint communique issued with the RAF in January calling for a common anti-imperialist front in Western Europe. The second "domestic"

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¹ This article concentrates on indigenous terrorism conducted in Western Europe last year. Terrorism of Middle Eastern origin that occurred in Western Europe will be treated separately in a forthcoming issue.

faction apparently did not approve of "alliances" with other terrorist groups—even alliances that were only rhetorical—and preferred to continue traditional AD operations, mainly bombing property targets in the middle of the night when casualties are unlikely. Such attacks are usually associated with various domestic political issues, such as opposition to French involvement in South Africa.

Numerous terrorist attacks against French interests were carried out by separatist groups attempting to win independence from France. In particular, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) accounted for 92 of the 144 indigenous incidents in France in 1985. The FLNC typically set off multiple property bombs simultaneously during the night. Although its attacks have not generally caused casualties, five persons were killed and four wounded last year. For the fourth consecutive year, however, the number of FLNC attacks declined. Other separatist movements—Iparretarak (the French counterpart to Spain's Basque separatist organization), the New Caledonian Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance, and the Breton Revolutionary Army—were responsible for numerous incidents, most of which were property bombings. These groups caused only one fatality and no reported injuries.

As in previous years, France was also the stage for anti-Basque terrorism in 1985. The violent Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) carried out 11 attacks against exiles belonging to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group in France, killing 10 persons and wounding eight others. ETA retaliated by attacking French targets in Spain, thus contributing to a cycle of violence that is likely to continue.

In Belgium the CCC continued to target US and NATO facilities, although by the end of the year domestic installations—which, according to communiques, represented capitalism and bourgeois militarism—had become increasingly favored targets. In January the group detonated a car bomb outside the NATO Support Facility in Brussels, and two US military personnel barely escaped serious injury.

Previous CCC attacks had been limited to property damage, but, in a communique following this bombing, the group claimed that US military personnel were appropriate terrorist targets. In May the CCC caused its first fatalities when two firemen were killed while they were trying to defuse a car bomb set by the group. The CCC received much negative publicity following the deaths of the firemen, and it later claimed that the police were actually responsible because they had not arrived at the scene quickly enough. To emphasize the point, the CCC bombed the gendarmerie administrative offices in Brussels a few days later.

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In April an apparently new group—the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP)—claimed responsibility for bombing a building that housed the North Atlantic Assembly, and for bombing a West German firm. The group, which is believed to be a splinter of the CCC, was responsible for several other attacks in 1985.

By the end of the summer, Belgian police had located an FRAP safehouse, and in December they were able to arrest several leading CCC members. This led to the subsequent discovery of more CCC and FRAP safehouses. Police successes have probably weakened the groups, but the CCC, in particular, may be able to rebuild its organization over time.

In *Italy*, following at least 13 months of inactivity, the Red Brigades returned to action in March with the murder in Rome of Enzo Tarantelli, a prominent labor economist. Despite expectations of security officials, however, that the Brigades would join the other major West European terrorist groups in attacking NATO, the group never participated in the 1985 "campaign." The Red Brigades suffered setbacks during the year as Italian police arrested numerous members, including Barbara Balzarani, the most wanted group leader. In addition to the arrests, group activity was limited by a second year of factional struggle. The Tarantelli murder was the only operation claimed by the Brigades in a year in which Palestinian terrorists conducted the two major terrorist incidents in Italy—the Achille Lauro

hijacking in October and the Rome airport shooting attack in December.

there has been considerable speculation that the bombing was carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists.

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In Spain the Military Wing of the Basque separatist organization Fatherland and Liberty (ETA-M) remained the most serious terrorist problem in 1985, despite counterterrorist successes by Spanish and French police and continued murders of Spanish Basques by the rightwing GAL. ETA-M conducted a series of bombings against tourist targets during the spring and summer, but caused only two injuries and very little property damage. The group also carried out an offensive against Spanish police and military officials that left 29 dead and several dozen more wounded. ETA-M imposed a cease-fire between mid-September and mid-November, while the group's leadership appeared to attempt to negotiate with the Spanish Government for several demands, including unification of the Spanish and French Basque regions and amnesty for all Basque political prisoners and exiles. ETA-M's return to violence probably signaled dissatisfaction with the negotiation efforts. Although all of ETA-M's attacks in 1985 were directed at Spanish targets, an American passer-by was killed in an attack on the Guardia Civil in September.

The small, violent, anti-US wing of the Basque Communist Party, Iraultza, claimed responsibility for at least five bombings against US businesses in 1985. Iraultza attacks continued to be characterized by low-yield explosives placed near buildings. Since December 1982, when the group began targeting US firms, it has been responsible for more than 25 bombings of US multinationals in the Basque region of Spain.

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In Portugal the leftist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) continued to attack US- and NATO-related interests, which the group had begun targeting in late 1984. A mortar attack against NATO warships in January was followed by the bombing of 18 West German automobiles at Beja the next month. Although the group claimed that these attacks were part of the West European "anti-NATO campaign," they were most likely conducted in solidarity rather than in coordination with other European leftist groups.

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Spain's other major indigenous terrorists, the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), received a serious setback in January 1985 when Spanish police arrested 18 of the leading members and seized large quantities of arms and ammunition. The group was relatively inactive during the rest of the year, but GRAPO is known for its resiliency and will probably be able to rebuild its organization

FP-25's terrorist acts during the remainder of the year were directed mainly at indigenous Portuguese targets, and included two assassinations. In one of these a key witness in the trial of FP-25 members arrested in 1984 was killed, which caused a delay in the trial of 50 other FP-25 defendants. In September, 10 alleged members of the group escaped from prison. The trial, which finally began in October, continued into 1986.

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In April, GRAPO did claim credit for the bombing of the El Descanso Restaurant near Torrejon Airbase that killed 18 Spaniards and wounded 82 others, including 15 Americans. Responsibility for the bombing also was claimed by several other terrorist groups, including ETA, Islamic Jihad, and the Armed Organization of the Jewish People. Although some Spanish officials believe that the forensic evidence proves that GRAPO was responsible for the bombing, there is no consensus among investigating officials that GRAPO was indeed the perpetrator. In fact

In Greece the level of terrorist activity remained high, and both indigenous and Middle Eastern terrorism continued to cause great concern. One-third of the incidents that occurred there last year were directed against US targets, many in the form of arson and bombing attacks against vehicles belonging to US military personnel in Athens. The Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) and the virulently anti-US 17 November Revolutionary Organization—which in

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years past had murdered two Americans and wounded another—continued to pose serious threats to US interests in Greece. Early in the year 17 November murdered a Greek publisher whom it identified as pro-American. In February a bomb exploded at "Bobby's II," a bar in the Athens suburb of Glyfada that was frequented by US servicemen. Responsibility for the attack has not been established, but American customers (59 of whom were wounded in the attack) may have been the intended targets. Greece continued to provide easy access and transit for Middle Eastern terrorists, as seen in the TWA hijacking in June.

In Luxembourg unknown persons carried out 14 bombings against domestic targets in 1985. Luxembourg officials believe the attacks were intended to discredit the government but that they were not politically motivated. Security officials have no suspects in the bombings.

In Northern Ireland an upsurge in Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) violence may have been tied to the agreement which was signed between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. This agreement provides a framework for the establishment of an intergovernmental body to deal with political, legal, and security matters in Northern Ireland. The IRA launched a campaign against businessmen and laborers who accepted contracts to build or refurbish police stations for the Royal Ulster Constabulary. In June the group detonated its first bomb in downtown Belfast in two years and exploded another bomb outside a crowded shopping center in Londonderry in October. Security officials suspected that the group has improved its capability to work with bombs.

Outlook

Terrorism—both international and domestic—will continue to be a serious problem for Western Europe. Although police officials had some counterterrorist successes against indigenous groups in 1985, many such terrorist groups have proved themselves capable of rebuilding their organizations over time. The pool of potential terrorist recruits—leftwing radicals who are dissatisfied with society—is large in most West European countries. Most of the leftist-anarchist or

Marxist groups, such as AD, the CCC, and the RAF, can draw from these pools to rebuild their hardcores whenever members are arrested or killed. Separatist organizations, such as ETA and the Provisional IRA espouse goals that carry a certain amount of emotional appeal to their respective communities, and consequently they receive support from these communities (even if the majority of those populations is opposed to violent tactics). Thus the indigenous terrorist problem is unlikely to go away

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The spillover of Middle Eastern terrorism into Western Europe is a growing—and more alarming problem. Many Palestinian groups, as well as the state sponsors of terrorism, have carried out intragroup warfare in Western Europe for several years. In 1985 there was an increasing tendency for those Middle Eastern groups to choose Western targets, and the trend has continued into 1986. Given the number of military, economic, and political targets available, the implications of this development are ominous. Western governments will find it increasingly necessary to improve counterterrorist coordination if such activities are to be curtailed. Countries like Cyprus and Greece, which serve as major transit points for Middle Eastern terrorists as well as staging grounds for terrorist actions, must find a way to control the entry and exit of foreigners if the problem in Western Europe is to be brought under control.

A development related to that of Middle Eastern activity in Europe is the spillover of violence into countries that have previously not had a terrorist problem. Scandinavia is a particular area of concern. In 1985 several bombings occurred in Copenhagen, some of which were probably Middle Eastern-related. Security officials in most of the Scandinavian countries have expressed concern that such attacks will become increasingly likely in 1986, and they point to the growing number of Middle Easterners who have applied for visas or asylum in their countries. Such countries, which have not had much experience with international terrorism in the past, will find it difficult to deal effectively with the problem.

| We conclude that the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) is making considerable headway in its campaign to stage frequent antiregime protests, | Chilean Communist Party Strength, Leadership, and Organization |
|---|--|
| harass the security forces, and gain acceptance as the country's leading opposition forces. The PCCh is one of the oldest, best organized and, after Cuba's, the largest such party in Latin America. Chilean Communist leaders reportedly have decided to promote a national uprising against President Pinochet in 1986. | The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has regained much of the strength it enjoyed during the Allende era. By early 1985 it reportedly had 30,000 members and its youth wing numbered 20,000. It probably also has about 100,000 inactive members and hardcore sympathizers. Most of these elements are located in Santiago and a few other large urban areas. The |
| The Communists reportedly think that other parties, including the centrist Christian Democrats—the country's largest party—also realize that 1986 is a critical year and are, therefore, becoming more willing to collaborate with the PCCh in demonstrations. We believe, however, that the Communists will succeed in neither becoming Chile's main opposition force nor in destabilizing the Pinochet regime any time soon. In our judgment, the PCCh will not deviate from its basic strategy of seeking to oust Pinochet by force, and we believe that it is following a timetable that calls for launching an all-out insurrection within the next three to four years (see inset). | PCCh's major recruitment gains in recent years have been among jobless and underemployed youth, as well as among university and secondary school students. It has only limited strength in organized labor—largely because of the government's efforts to depoliticize the unions—but controls about 20 percent of union leadership positions and has strong influence in the country's main umbrella opposition labor group. The party is led by Secretary General Luis Corvalan, who has lived in Moscow since 1976, and other exiled leaders, who make up about half of the Central Committee. |
| iolence on the Rise | |
| The US Embassy reports that following a monthlong eries of university student protests during April—in | A generation gap has developed between the exiled leaders, who are in |
| which the Communists played a prominent role—eftist terrorist activity has intensified. Over the May | their sixties, and key internal Central Committee members, who are in their middle thirties, but there |

¹ Chile was the scene of more terrorist bombings (865) than any other country in the world during 1985. The above article describes the political strategy of the parent group of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which was responsible for most of those incidents.

including one against the US Ambassador's residence

claimed by the PCCh-affiliated Manuel Rodriguez

Patriotic Front (FPMR), and shootouts between terrorists and police and Army units resulting in several casualties (see inset and accompanying article

Day weekend there were numerous bombings,

on the FPMR). There were repeated violent confrontations between protestors and the security forces that resulted in considerable property damage in the capital and in several provincial cities.

is no evidence of significant internal schisms or

divisiveness. The PCCh has substantial financial

resources and is one of the few Chilean political

groups with a sizable salaried staff.

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Leftist Terrorist Bombings in Chile

1983—139

1984—735

1985-865

1986—continuing unabated (in April alone, there were at least 85 bombings, according to the US Embassy)

We believe that the bulk of these bombings have been carried out by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which, was

created in late 1983 and initially comprised about 100 young militants from the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and several other radical leftist groups. The FPMR's favorite targets have been electrical power grids—it frequently blacks out Santiago and much of central Chile—railway lines, commuter buses, and public establishments in major cities, but most of its bombings apparently have been staged to avoid widespread civilian injuries. By late 1985 the FPMR reportedly had grown substantially, and we estimate that it currently comprises at least 1,000 militants—about half in Santiago and the rest in other urban areas. In recent months the Front has

staged more sophisticated and lethal terrorist actions,

Until 1983 the pro-Castro Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) committed the great majority of antiregime terrorist incidents, but late that year it suffered sharp reverses at the hands of the security services and was forced temporarily to halt its terrorist acts. By 1985 the MIR reportedly had revitalized its apparatus within Chile—increasing its strength to a total of 400 to 500 members—and was preparing to compete with the FPMR as the leading terrorist group. It claimed credit for the bombing of a police bus in February 1986, which resulted in numerous casualties, but has yet to resume a sustained level of terrorist operations.

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Scattered protest activity has persisted since May Day, while student leaders have threatened to call a prolonged strike unless the government ends its intervention in the universities. The US Embassy, however, has predicted that the security forces' strong-arm methods against students and faculty will backfire, leading many Chileans to question the government's ability to quell student agitation.

For their part the Communists reportedly believe that popular support is growing for a wide range of anti-Pinochet activities, including a national work stoppage. They also are said to believe that the security forces cannot control the unrest on university campuses and that elsewhere the Carabineros, the militialike national police, are becoming increasingly reluctant to act vigorously against demonstrators. We believe that the Carabineros—who have become overextended as they have tried to contain repeated protests—are in fact becoming frustrated over what



A carabinero checks the body of a slain comrade.

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Suspected terrorists rounded up.

they perceive as Pinochet's favoritism toward the Army and his recent decision to replace Carabineros with Army troops in many crowd control missions.

The Communists and other far-left parties are said to have recently organized a unified slumdwellers association. They reportedly expect to use this new entity to publicize demands for improved living conditions among the poor and to mobilize slumdwellers for antiregime demonstrations. The Communists also reportedly want to recruit slumdwellers for a "popular army," and to create "liberated zones" in some slums where FPMR units would be ordered to challenge the security forces.

The quality of life is said to be deteriorating in the numerous slums ringing Santiago, where youth unemployment ranges up to 50 percent.

Santiago's slums—where probably over 1.5 million of the city's roughly 4 million inhabitants live—is becoming explosive and that the poor are becoming politically radicalized and increasingly receptive to the violent line urged by the PCCh and other far-left

groups. Moreover, leaders of several moderate opposition parties have told US officials that the government's heavyhanded actions during recent repeated sweeps of slum neighborhoods have produced a sense of "rage" among the poor that contrasts with the fear produced by previous dragnets. We believe that this adds to the explosive situation in the slums and ultimately will benefit the Communists and their allies.

Moderate Opposition Activities

Moderate opposition forces are also gearing up for more forceful antiregime activities. The key player is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which reportedly decided recently to push vigorously for a national strike. The Christian Democrats are currently consulting with other parties regarding a strike, and the party's president is said to have created a secret coordinating committee to work with the PCCh to prepare for the strike and other protests. Christian Democratic leaders, moreover, have acknowledged that there is substantial grassroots cooperation between their party and the Communists, which they justify by citing Pinochet's intractability on political liberalization and the need to convince the

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from bases in the north to the Santiago area, created armed forces through demonstrations and other opposition activities that Chile is becoming new antisubversive commando units, and ordered ungovernable under Pinochet's harsh policies. large numbers of soldiers into the streets to supplant Carabineros during recent demonstrations. The US 25X1 Embassy has reported that Army troops were An influential minority of the Catholic Church's 31 deployed in unprecedented numbers over the May bishops and lower levels of the hierarchy reportedly Day weekend and that the security forces often used are pressing for a more activist Church stance against excessive force against demonstrators. In addition Pinochet. According to the press, even Cardinal-Army units led sweeps of slum neighborhoods in Primate Fresno met several weeks ago with recent weeks. 25X1 representatives of the PCCh-led political coalition to discuss the worsening political situation. This, in our view, was a significant development, because Fresno had previously avoided open contact with the Communists and had strongly urged the moderate opposition to forgo all political collaboration with the PCCh. In addition the US Embassy has noted that the country's conference of bishops issued a strong statement in April urging constitutional reforms widely interpreted as a call for direct presidential elections in 1989—and that even progovernment groups endorsed the bishops' stand. Finally, in May some 18 leading professional, academic, social, and labor organizations of varying Pinochet has refused to budge as pressure has built political hues created a so-called National Civic within the regime for some show of flexibility and Assembly and promulgated a set of demands for opposition protests have continued. In several recent urgent political and economic reforms. They also speeches, he has rejected modifications to the elected a multiparty directorate that includes two Constitution—which allows for his reelection in a Communists and a few other far leftists. The US single candidate plebiscite in 1989—and refused to Embassy has said that the Christian Democrats—the speed up political liberalization. main force behind the Civic Assembly—believe they can mobilize considerable popular support for such protest activities as business shutdowns, strikes by professional guilds, and a campaign to withhold debt and mortgage payments. Leaders of the Civic Assembly reportedly hope that these acts of civil disobedience will create growing uncertainty and help build further support for the planned national strike. Outlook 25X1 We believe the Communists have little chance of **Government Reaction** sparking a successful uprising against Pinochet over the President and the next year, but that they will continue to make 25X1 senior Army commanders are convinced that the headway in their efforts to sow violence and radical left will make a concerted effort to overthrow uncertainty. Moreover, moderate opposition groups the government in 1986 and that they are planning will probably cooperate more frequently and openly physical attacks on Pinochet, junta members, and military officers. The Army has moved 10,000 troops

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| with the PCCh, at the risk of adding to a climate of |
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| violence and of playing into Pinochet's hands. Given |
| Pinochet's current intransigence, the moderates seem |
| prepared to take this risk in order to pressure the |
| military into making Pinochet more flexible. |

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The test of the Communists' strength—and that of the moderate opposition—will, in our view, be their ability to sustain the current level of protest activity and to build momentum toward a national strike during the next three to four months. Even though protest activity is likely to continue at a high level for several more months-accompanied by frequent and increasingly lethal terrorist bombings-prospects for a successful prolonged national strike do not appear bright at present. Opposition protest activity, increased terrorism, and growing unease within the government and the armed forces over Pinochet's leadership, however, will probably leave the President more and more isolated. He may also have to contend with having his authority undermined within the military. Many officers are beginning to question the soundness of his decisions and may begin to pressure him to shift course or face a more open challenge from the military.

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Chile: The Dangerous FPMR

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On 11 March the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) officially began its "first offensive of 1986" by blowing up two high-tension towers and temporarily cutting off power to the city of Santiago. Two weeks later, on the night of 26 March and the morning of 27 March, the group set off more than 40 bombs in the cities of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepcion in support of Student Mobilization Day.

The FPMR—an urban terrorist group affiliated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh)—has been responsible for most of the 1,600 bombings that have occurred in Chile over the past two years and reportedly is planning several major bombing campaigns in 1986. The FPMR also has been responsible for the increase in anti-US attacks in Chile since 1983. Most of these attacks have been against nonofficial targets—such as businesses, Mormon churches, and binational cultural centers—although the group also detonated a car bomb in front of the US Consulate in Santiago last July.



FPMR terrorists introduce an alleged deserter from the Chilean Paramilitary Police Force at a clandestine press conference in December 1985.

Origins and Organization

The FPMR apparently was formed in 1983 by members of various Chilean leftist organizations—including the PCCh, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Socialist/Almeyda, and the La Chispa group—who probably were frustrated by the loss of momentum both in the legitimate protest movement and in terrorist violence. The group claimed responsibility for its first terrorist attack in December 1983 but didn't begin to gain prominence until it carried out a one-week-long, coordinated bombing campaign in late October 1984.

We believe the FPMR today numbers about 1,000 members, including group supporters and

¹ The FPMR took its name from Manuel Rodriguez, a 19th century guerrilla leader executed by the Spanish during the wars of independence.

sympathizers who rent safehouses, purchase supplies, distribute propaganda, and plant bombs. In most operations, an FPMR militant reportedly sets the timing mechanism on the bomb and instructs a new recruit or group supporter on where and when to leave it.

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000200360003-6 Secret The PCCh apparently also encouraged the FPMR to 25X1 begin expanding its membership last year. A special edition of the PCCh fly sheet Barricada distributed last April to PCCh and FPMR members urged its readers to form more militia units—supplying their own weapons—and to open their membership to those outside the Communist community. 25X1 25X1 Foreign Support Since 1973, Cuba has promoted violence as the way to 25X1 destabilize Chilean society and overthrow President Pinochet. Although the MIR is still the main Chilean recipient of its support, 25X1 Havana also provides weapons and training to the The PCCh Connection FPMR through the PCCh. 25X1 the FPMR is 25X1 the armed wing of the PCCh—an accusation both In April 1985 the PCCh reportedly received from organizations deny. There are, however, clear links Cuba the first of several promised arms shipments-25X1 between the two. We believe that the PCCh helped develop the FPMR in its early stages and has been working ever since to exert more direct control over the group. 25X1 25X1 Cuba probably smuggles arms and 25X1 money to the FPMR through traditional drug and contraband routes in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. 25X1 FPMR members apparently have also received training in Cuba and several other countries. In early 25X1 We believe that the PCCh funnels new recruits to the June 1985 approximately 120 Chilean exiles FPMR and advises the group on organization and reportedly had begun to return clandestinely to Chile policy matters as a means to gain greater control over after having received military training abroad. 25X1 the latter. 25X1 25X1

Tactics and Targets

The FPMR has conducted at least 1,600 bombings since it emerged in 1983. Its most common targets—

bridges, railway lines, electricity pylons, public utilities, banks, businesses, and municipal buildings are selected to have maximum impact without inflicting indiscriminate casualties. In addition to the bombings, in 1985 the group conducted incendiary attacks against commercial establishments and the public transportation system as it had in previous years. The FPMR usually avoids casualties by setting off most of its bombs in the late night or very early morning hours and by targeting property rather than people. It has been responsible, however, for the deaths of several civilians and security personnel over in past two years. For example in March 1984 the group detonated a remote-controlled bomb on a bus carrying 25 policemen in Santiago, killing one and injuring 15, including four bystanders.

The FPMR also has become increasingly bold and sophisticated in its operations. In October 1984 it conducted the first successful car bombing in Chile when it set off 35 kilograms of explosives inside a taxi parked near the headquarters of the military junta in Santiago, injuring five people. Three more car bombings—including one last February that wounded 14 policemen in Santiago—have been conducted since then. In another development the FPMR fired rockets successfully for the first time late last year in attacks against an electrical power plant in Valparaiso and an Army airfield in Santiago.

Although the bulk of its bombings are still directed against domestic targets, the FPMR also attacks US and other foreign interests in Chile. We believe the FPMR was responsible for seven anti-US attacks in 1984 and 10 in 1985, including one against a Coca-Cola facility in Santiago that caused \$2 million in property damage. In July 1985 the group also bombed six Mormon churches and the US-Chilean cultural center, reportedly to protest the proposed accord on the use of Easter Island as an emergency landing site for the space shuttle. The car bombing of the US Consulate last July was the first FPMR attack against a US Government facility.

Dangerous Prospects

We expect that the FPMR will continue to pose the main terrorist threat in Chile over the next two or three years. The PCCh Central Committee reported

last fall that Chilean Communists had decided on a policy of "increasing confrontation" with the Pinochet regime and PCCh leaders reportedly perceive 1986 as a critical year for the FPMR. Already the PCCh reportedly is pushing the FPMR to conduct more daring terrorist operations against property and personnel of the Chilean Government and military. The FPMR was bolstered by the return of many members from terrorist training abroad and significantly increased its forces within Chile last year, suggesting that the group is prepared to escalate 25X1 its violence. In addition to the hundreds of bombings expected in 1986, the FPMR is likely to engage in more spectacular and lethal armed attacks. FPMR 25X1 armaments reportedly now include machineguns, machine pistols, and rocket and grenade launchers. 25X1 We also anticipate that the FPMR will increase its political activity in order to expand its narrow base of popular support in the cities. According to press reports, FPMR leaders say that the organization is still in its "preparatory phase" and that a "general armed struggle" is two or three years away. PCCh and FPMR leaders probably calculate that a successful popular uprising requires neighborhood 25X1 rebellions and prolonged and widespread strikes, in addition to dramatic terrorist attacks. 25X1 25X1

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| | The Terrorism Diary for July |
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| | Below is a compendium of July dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event. |
| 1 July 1867 | Canada. Dominion Day. |
| 1 July 1921 | China. Founding of Communist Party. |
| 1 July 1960 | Ghana. Republic Day. |
| 1 July 1960 | Somalia. Republic Day; Independence Day (southern region). |
| 1 July 1962 | Burundi. Independence Day. |
| 1 July 1962 | Rwanda. Independence Day. |
| 1 July 1974 | Argentina. Death of President Juan Peron. |
| 1 July 1980 | Peru. Since 1980, for unknown reasons, Sendero Luminoso terrorists have attacked foreign targets during July at a rate roughly triple that of the rest of the year. |
| 2 July 1976 | Vietnam. Unification of North and South into Socialist Republic of Vietnam. |
| 4 July 1776 | United States. Independence Day. |
| 4 July 1946 | Philippines. Republic Day (date on which Philippines became an independent republic). |
| 4 July 1976 | Israel, Uganda, Palestinians. Israeli raid on airport at Entebbe frees hostages from PFLP skyjackers. |
| 5 July 1811 | Venezuela. Independence Day. |
| 5 July 1962 | Algeria. Independence Day. |
| 5 July 1973 | Rwanda. Coup led by Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana inaugurates Second Republic. |
| 5 July 1975 | Cape Verde. Independence Day. |
| 5 July 1977 | Pakistan. Coup by Gen. Zia Ul-Haq (overthrowing regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto). |
| 6 July 1964 | Malawi. Independence Day. |

| 6 July 1966 | Malawi. Republic Day. |
|--------------|--|
| 6 July 1975 | Comoro Islands. Declaration of independence. |
| 7 July | Yugoslavia. Uprising Day (state holiday in Socialist Republic of Serbia). |
| 7 July 1973 | Equatorial Guinea. National Day (based on constitution that granted virtually unlimited powers to President Macie; constitution was abrogated when he was overthrown by his nephew, Colonel Obiang). |
| 7 July 1978 | Solomon Islands. Independence Day. |
| 9 July 1816 | Argentina. Independence Day. |
| 9 July 1929 | Morocco. Birthday of King Hassan II. |
| 10 July 1973 | The Bahamas. Independence Day. |
| 10 July 1978 | Mauritania. Armed Forces Day (commemorates military coup). |
| 11 July 1921 | Mongolia. Revolution Day (celebrates independence from China). |
| 12 July 1690 | Northern Ireland. Orangemen's Day (Protestants march to commemorate victory in Battle of the Boyne). |
| 12 July 1975 | Sao Tome and Principe. Independence Day. |
| 12 July 1979 | Kiribati. Independence Day. |
| 13 July | Yugoslavia. Uprising Day (state holiday in Socialist Republic of Montenegro). |
| 14 July 1789 | France. Bastille Day. |
| 14 July 1958 | Iraq. Republic Day (commemorates Army coup d'etat that overthrew monarchy and established republic). |
| 15 July 1946 | Brunei. Sultan's birthday. |
| 15 July 1948 | Burma. Communist Party founded. |
| 15 July 1974 | Cyprus. Coup by Greek Army officers. |
| 15 July 1983 | Italy. Conviction of four members of Italian counterterrorist team for mistreatment of Red Brigades prisoners captured during rescue of General Dozier. |
| 17 July 1930 | Colombia. Founding of Communist Party. |
| 17 July 1968 | Iraq. Revolution Day (overthrow of Qasim regime by Ba'th Party and its allies). |

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| 17 July 1973 | Afghanistan. Republic Day (commemorates date that Muhammad Daoud led military coup overthrowing his cousin, King Zahir Shah, and establishing republic). |
|--------------|--|
| 18 July 1830 | Uruguay. Proclamation of republic. |
| 18 July 1936 | Spain. Uprising Day (beginning of Civil War); Generalissimo Franco's Day. |
| 19 July 1979 | Nicaragua. Sandinista provisional Junta of National Reconstruction assumes office. |
| 20 July | Esala Poya Day (largest annual Buddhist festival celebrated by majority Sinhalese). |
| 20 July 1810 | Colombia. Independence Day. |
| 20 July 1974 | Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot Peace and Freedom Day (commemorates intervention by Turkish forces). |
| 20 July 1983 | Sri Lanka. Sinhalese backlash sparked by terrorist acts of extremist Tamil separatists leaves hundreds of Tamils dead and thousands homeless. |
| 21 July 1831 | Belgium. Independence Day. |
| 21 July 1972 | Northern Ireland. Bloody Friday—20 Provisional IRA bombings in Belfast kill 11 and injure 120. |
| 22 July | Yugoslavia. Uprising Day (state holiday in Socialist Republic of Slovenia). |
| 22 July 1944 | Poland. Liberation Day. |
| 22 July 1952 | Poland. People's Republic established. |
| 22 July 1971 | Sudan. Countercoup ousts Communists, restores Nimeiri as head of government. |
| 23 July 1952 | Egypt. National Day (commemorates military coup ousting King Farouk). |
| 23 July 1970 | Oman. Accession Day of Sultan Qabus. |
| 23 July 1974 | Greece. Resignation of military junta; return of government to civilian rule. |
| 24 July 1783 | Ecuador, Venezuela. Birthday of Simon Bolivar. |
| 25 July 1648 | Netherlands. Independence Day. |
| 25 July 1957 | Tunisia. Proclamation of republic. |

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| 25 July 1983 | Sri Lanka. Killing of Tamil prisoners in Colombo's Welikade jail exacerbates communal hatred. |
|--------------|--|
| 26 July 1847 | Liberia. Independence Day. |
| 26 July 1952 | Argentina. Death of Eva Peron. |
| 26 July 1953 | Cuba. Day of National Rebellion (commemorates attack on Moncada Barracks by 26th of July Movement). |
| 26 July 1956 | Egypt. Nationalization of Suez Canal. |
| 26 July 1965 | Maldives. Independence Day. |
| 27 July | Yugoslavia. Uprising Day (state holiday in Socialist Republics of Croatia and Bosnia). |
| 27 July 1953 | North Korea. Korean Victory Day (date of armistice). |
| 27 July 1955 | Austria. Restoration of sovereignty under postwar Four Powers' Agreement. |
| 28 July 1821 | Peru. Independence Day. |
| 29 July 1966 | Nigeria. Coup d'etat led by Col. Yakubu Gowon overthrows military government of Maj. Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi and establishes Federal Military Government. |
| 29 July 1975 | Nigeria. Coup d'etat led by Brig. Gen. Murtala Ramat Muhammad overthrows General Gowon and establishes Federal Executive Council. |
| 30 July 1980 | Vanuatu. Independence Day. |
| 31 July | Spain, France. St. Ignactius's Day (patron saint of Basques). |
| 31 July 1969 | Spain, France. Founding of Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). |

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| | Chronology of Terrorism—1986 | 25 X 1 |
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| | Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. | 25X1 |
| February | Turkey: Local gardener finds handgun used in July 1985 slaying of Jordanian diplomat. The gun and eight bullets were wrapped in a plastic bag and buried in an Ankara park; the killer remains unknown. | 25 X 1 |
| 17 February | France: Alleged Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction accomplice arrested in Grenoble on charges of harboring a criminal. Martine Toulette admitted providing lodging for Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, leader of the LARF, on several occasions from 1981 to 1982. | 25X1 |
| March | Panama: New terrorist group claims credit for bombings. The previously unknown "Hugo Spadafora Franco Column" of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD), claimed in a communique to a Costa Rican newspaper that its "freedom commandos" were responsible for several bombings in Panama in early 1986 and denounced what it calls the "corrupt dictatorship" in Panama. Nothing else is known about the group. It may be operating from Chiriqui Province, the home of its slain namesake, Hugo Spadafora. | 25 X 1 |
| 5 April | India: Sikh extremists kill six policemen and wound four others in freeing three prisoners at District Court in Jullundur. The prisoners were on trial for the slaying of a leading Hindu newspaper editor in May 1984. | 25X1 |
| 11 April | Pakistan: Pakistan People's Party leader escapes assassination attempt in Lahore. A former Army officer was arrested on the grounds of the home of Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of executed former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who returned from exile in 1985. The press claims that government sources paid the officer to kill her. | 25 X 1 |
| 12 April | India: Sikh militants kill Congress-I Party leader near his rice mill and shoot two farmers in Amritsar District. Two suspects were caught by villagers. The three reportedly were moderates who refused to support a separate Sikh state. | 25X1 |
| 18-19 April | Turkey: Police defuse two bombs at KOC American Bank in Istanbul. No group has claimed responsibility. | 25 X 1 |

| 20 April | West Germany: Arson attack against McDonald's restaurant in Bonn causes damage but no injuries. A group calling itself the "Revolutionary Cells in Bonn" claimed responsibility. The group may be connected with the nationally active Red Cells. | 25 X 1 |
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| | Pakistan: Powerful bomb explodes in stairwell of Green's Hotel in Peshawar, injuring one person and causing extensive damage to the building. The hotel contains the British Airways office and its restaurant is often frequented by foreigners. No group has claimed responsibility. | 25X1 |
| 21 April | Mozambique: Car bomb explodes in central Maputo, killing one person and injuring at least 50 others. Police found and defused another bomb nearby. Although South African license plates were found on the wrecked vehicle, the insurgent National Resistance Movement is believed responsible. | 25X1 |
| | Philippines: Dynamite bomb found and defused by police at Conjuangco Building in Manila. The building is owned by the family of President Corazon Aquino. A previously unknown Muslim group, "Moro al Fatah," has claimed responsibility. | 25 X 1 |
| | Philippines: Gunman kills newly appointed mayor of Alicia in restaurant. He was the first mayor to be killed, probably by the Communist New People's Army, since the overthrow of former President Marcos. Town elections set for May were postponed. | 25X1 |
| | Japan: Vehicles belonging to Self-Defense Force personnel firebombed in parking lot of private residence on Okinawa. No group has claimed credit. | 25X1 |
| 22 April | Greece: Gardener discovers briefcase containing 20 kilograms of Semtex-H explosive in Lagonisi. Semtex-H, a Czechoslovak product, is not commercially available in Greece. Police suspect terrorists hid the explosives. | 25 X 1 |
| | Corsica: Explosion damages tourist holiday camp near Bastia. The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica claimed responsibility for the attack. | 25 X 1 |
| | Thailand: Bomb explodes inside compound of US Consulate in Songkhla. The bomb was thrown from a passing car and caused minor damage, but no casualties. No one has claimed responsibility for the incident, but local authorities suspect Muslim separatists, who have long been funded by Libya. | 25X1 |
| 23 April | Greece: Suitcase containing Semtex explosive found on beach east of Athens. It is not known what group was responsible for the device or how it was intended to be used. | 25 X 1 |

| | Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes in Colombo police station, injuring nine persons. Bomb disposal experts had found a suspicious parcel on a bus and were examining it at the time it went off. Tamil rebels are believed responsible for the device. | 25X1 |
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| 24-25 April | United Kingdom: Police arrest three men after discovering arms cache in London. The weapons probably were meant for a Protestant group opposed to the Anglo-Irish accord. | 25 X 1 |
| 25 April | West Germany: Firebombing of NATO pipeline pumping station in Vollersode causes extensive damage. Unidentified perpetrators cut through a wire mesh fence and threw an incendiary device inside. There have been no claims of responsibility. | 25 X 1 |
| 26 April | France: Bomb explodes at building housing American Express and Control Data Corporation offices in Lyon. A slogan reading "Control Data, American Express, Black and Decker, go home" was found painted on a wall near the building. No group has claimed credit for the bombing, but police suspect the domestic faction of the terrorist group Action Directe was responsible. A Black and Decker executive was killed the day before by an unknown assailant. | 25 X 1 |
| 27 April | Northern Ireland: Police defuse massive car bomb in Belfast after receiving telephone warning. The bomb was set to explode as hundreds of Protestants marched in annual church parades. There was no claim of responsibility, but the Provisional Irish Republican Army probably was responsible. | 25X1 |
| | France: Car bomb in Toulouse causes little damage and no injuries. The stolen car contained six large bottles of liquid butane—three of which failed to explode. There was no claim of responsibility. | 25 X 1 |
| | Portugal: Two gunmen spray Lisbon police station with machinegun fire, injuring one policeman. The Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) claimed that it carried out the attack in retaliation for a beating suffered by an FP-25 terrorist at the time of his arrest. | 25X1 |
| | Portugal: Weapons discovered in Lisbon residential area, presumably belonging to FP-25. Police estimate the cache may date from late 1984. | 25 X 1 |
| | Bangladesh: Bomb explodes at Jagannath College, severely wounding lecturer and guard. No group claimed responsibility, but the blast is thought to have been politically motivated. | 25 X 1 |
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| 28 April | Lebanon: Two Cypriot students at American University kidnaped in West Beirut. No group has taken credit, but Hizballah is probably responsible. The kidnapers probably hope to obtain the release of three Palestinians and a Hizballah member jailed in Cyprus. | 25X1 |
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| | India: Congress-I Party member shot to death at his village home near Amritsar. He was the 45th person reported killed in Punjab that month. No one has claimed credit for the murder, but Sikh extremists probably were responsible. | 25 X 1 |
| | Japan: Bomb detonates in park adjacent to Defense Agency in Tokyo. A suspect, who was severely injured in the process of arming the device, was arrested. He probably was preparing the device to explode during a leftist rally scheduled to be held in the park later that same day. | 25X1 |
| 29 April | France: Bomb explodes outside Paris meeting place for abortion opposition groups. There were no injuries. No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing. | 25 X 1 |
| | Spain: Bombs explode at banks and employment office in Bilbao and San Sebastian, causing damage but no injuries. There were no claims of responsibility, but the terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty is suspected. | 25 X 1 |
| | Japan: Communication cables on several trains sabotaged in Tokyo, causing minor disruptions to service. The saboteurs were protesting the 60th anniversary celebrations of Emperor Hirohito's reign. The leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) later claimed responsibility. | 25X1 |
| 30 April | Canada: Sikh leader pleads guilty to unlawful possession of explosives and unregistered restricted weapon in British Columbia. Another Sikh had been charged with illegal possession of explosives, but charges against him were dropped in March. The charges stem from the investigation into the bombing of an Air India plane on 23 June 1985 that killed 329 persons | 25X1 |
| | India: Approximately 600 commandos occupy Golden Temple in Amritsar, killing one Sikh and injuring five others. This assault was handled by the Punjab state government and carefully coordinated to avoid affronting mainline Sikhs. The last assault on the Golden Temple was in June 1984 when the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered tanks and troops into the complex to flush out armed Sikh | |
| | extremists. | 25X1 |
| | Indonesia: Military police arrest two men in Jakarta with unspecified quantity of TNT and plastic explosives. Authorities believe the explosives were to be used to embarrass the government during President Reagan's visit to Bali. | 25X1 |

| May | Mexico: Mexican Army finds two bombs on military property. Both bombs were disposed of and a man was apprehended in connection with one of the devices. On the same day, the central military hospital received a bogus bomb threat. | 25X1 |
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| 1 May | India: Sikh extremists kill seven Hindus in three separate attacks in Amritsar. According to press reports, some 70 persons have been killed in the last two months in apparent retaliation for the 1984 storming of the Golden Temple. | 25X1 |
| 3 May | France: Three bombs explode in Marseilles area targeted against North African interests. A previously unknown group, "French Commandos Against a Maghreb Invasion," claimed responsibility. | 25 X 1 |
| | Spain: Police deactivate car bomb near police headquarters building in Bilbao. An anonymous caller claiming to belong to the terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty warned of the explosive device. | 25X1 |
| | Israel: Unknown assailants stab Israeli man in throat, partially paralyzing him. The attack occurred outside a store in Gaza. No group has claimed credit, but the attack appears similar to other stabbings thought to be the work of young Palestinians. | 25 X 1 |
| | Peru: Police discover Tupac Amaru safehouse in city of Callao. Along with small arms, explosives, and propaganda materials, police found a list of 14 diplomatic license plate numbers, including one belonging to the US commercial attache. | 25X1 |
| 4 May | Israel: Bomb blast in Jerusalem damages two cars. An anonymous caller claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the pro-Arafat Palestinian group Force 17. The blast marked the fifth bomb attack in Jerusalem this year. | 25 X 1 |
| 5 May | West Germany: Explosion at US military fuel depot in Kirchheimbolanden causes considerable damage, but no injuries. No claims of responsibility have been received, but members of the RAF periphery probably were responsible. | 25X1 |
| | Peru: Admiral assassinated in handgrenade attack. Rear Adm. Carlos Ponce Canessa, a member of the Navy's Chief of Staff office, was killed by a five-member hit team that attacked him with machineguns and grenades as he left his home. On 30 May police arrested a woman believed to have been one of the assassins. | 25X1 |
| | Nepal: Police arrest several men with explosives who entered the country from India. They claimed that they were sent by Ram Raja Prasad Singh, the radical antimonarchist who claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks in June 1985. | 25X1 |

| 6 May | Japan: Seventeen incendiary devices explode in toilets, garbage cans, and crowded platforms of Tokyo subway and train stations. There were no casualties or damage, but morning commuter service was disrupted. The radical left group Kakurokyo (Revolutionary Workers' Association) claimed responsibility. | | | |
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| 7 May | Lebanon: French businessman Camille Sontag kidnaped in West Beirut. No group has claimed responsibility, but the pro-Iranian group Hizballah is believed responsible. Sontag is the ninth Frenchman abducted in Lebanon since March 1985. | 25 X 1 | | |
| | Lebanon: Lebanese Christian professor kidnaped near American University campus in Beirut. Nabil Matar's kidnaping prompted another university strike to protest the kidnaping of faculty members. | 25 X 1 | | |
| 8 May | Nepal: Unidentified man dies trying to plant bomb at Kathmandu Airport. He was a member of the Indian-based militant organization led by Ram Raja Prasad Singh that opposes Nepal's partyless government system. On the same day, two powerful bombs exploded near the customs office and a municipal building in Birganj, causing no casualties. | 25 X 1 | | |
| 12 May | Pakistan: Police find homemade bombs in National Assembly member's car in Karachi. Approximately 40 "curfew breakers" were arrested, but it is not known who planted the devices. | 25 X 1 | | |
| 12-13 May | Colombia: 19th of April Movement claims credit for explosions at two US companies and British firm in Bogota. The US chancery building may have been the intended target of one of the bombings | 25X1 | | |
| 15 May | Peru: Car bomb explodes near Ayaccuho's main plaza, injuring two persons. The bomb was thought to contain about the equivalent of 15 kilograms of TNT. Local authorities believe the attack was the work of Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. | 25 X 1 | | |
| 16 May | Peru: Incendiary bombs set in four Lima theaters. In two cases, fires caused extensive damage, but no casualties; in the other two cases (one of the devices was in a theater next to the US Embassy), police defused the bombs before they exploded. No one claimed responsibility, but the attacks came two days before the sixth anniversary of the Sendero Luminoso group. | 25 X 1 | | |
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| 17 May | Nicaragua: Eight West German construction workers captured by Nicaraguan Democratic Force during fighting. The FDN admitted capturing them from garrisons of a Zelaya Department community on the Atlantic coast where they had been working on a construction project. They were all released unharmed on 11 June. | | |
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| | Peru: Mining town of Cerro de Pasco rocked by dynamite attacks on eve of Sendero Luminoso's sixth anniversary. Seven explosions caused minor damage to government offices and a police precinct. There were no injuries reported. | 25X1 25X1 | |
| | Brazil: Bomb explodes at Laranjeiras Palace in Rio de Janeiro before dinner for Salvadoran President. No injuries were reported and there was no claim of responsibility. | 25 X 1 | |
| 20 May | Mexico: Molotov cocktail hurled at US Consulate in Guadalajara by several unidentified persons. There were no injuries and only minor damage. | 25 X 1 | |
| 22 May | India: Sikhs bomb Hindu temple in Amritsar. There were no casualties reported. The incident occurred after 11 persons had been killed in two separate shooting incidents the same day; Sikh separatists are suspected in both cases. | 25 X 1 | |
| 23 May | United States: Judge sentences Sikh terrorist in Rajiv Gandhi assassination plot to seven years in prison. He still faces charges in Louisiana for his involvement in another plot to assassinate Haryana Chief Minister Bhajan Lal in New Orleans in May 1985. | 25X1 | |
| | United Kingdom: Judge reinstates charges against three Sikhs after freeing them on legal technicality. They were charged with plotting to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and were ordered to be sent directly for trial under a rarely issued Voluntary Bill of Indictment. | 25 X 1 | |
| | Lebanon: Photographs of four-man French television crew taken hostage in Beirut on 8 March released in Paris. The pictures showed them reading a current newspaper. They were reported to be in good health. | 25 X 1 | |
| | Sri Lanka: Police find large quantity of dynamite in garden of house in Colombo. Police believe the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front and a radical southern group were responsible for the cache. | 25X1 | |
| 26 May | Canada: Police charge four Canadian Sikhs with shooting Punjab Cabinet minister in Vancouver car ambush. The victim was a member of the state's moderate Akali Party, which came to power in October. The party has been criticized and attacked by Sikh separatists within India for negotiating with the central government. | 25 X 1 | |
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| 27 May | Peru: Bomb explodes at Trujillo Binational Center, injuring two students. Only minor damage resulted. The Sendero Luminoso group is thought to be responsible. | |
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| 28 May | Afghanistan: Bomb reportedly explodes in hotel in Ghazni, killing four persons and wounding three others. No group claimed responsibility for the incident. | 25\1 |

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